Dr. Cole goes on to describe many of the failures (particularly the failure to protect the Pilgrims to holy places now that the Mahdi Army has been removed from that job by the Americans, and the increase in the number of helicopters being lost to insurgent fire with the adjustments and increased risks this causes.)
Dr. Cole describes the mechanism of failure in this paragraph:
The U.S. strategy assumes that if violence can be dramatically reduced in Baghdad and Anbar, that will give the al-Maliki government breathing room and allow it to assert itself more forcefully. But so far the government hasn't been afforded much relief from the horrific attacks that daily undermine its credibility with the public and provoke destabilizing tribal and religious feuds. That matters, because if Iraqis do not feel that their government can protect them from violence, they will turn again to guerrillas and militiamen. These paramilitary forces, based in the neighborhoods, in turn carry out ethnic cleansing and attacks on police, and further undermine the authority of the central government.Elsewhere American commanders are already saying that the 21,500 additional troops will not be enough, that they need at least a further 4,000 to 6,000 and quickly.
Should I say "I told you so?" Yeah, and this is where I said it:
- Surge in Iraq! One last push!
12/21/2006 - Surge to be small - only 9000 troops available 01/06/2007
- There is no military solution in Iraq - Surgelet* will fail
01/08/2007 - Surge to require troops out of Afghanistan
01/09/2007 - My response to Bush's "surge" speech
01/17/2007 - The US in Iraq is like a bull in a ring being bled by picadores
02/02/2007 - British withdrawal of Iraq troops a blow to Bush's "surge."
02/22/2007
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