Three weeks into the "Surge" and the insurgents have adapted and making the efforts to pacify Baghdad and Anbar Province little more than a Chimera. This according to
Juan Cole, writing at Salon (Day Pass or subscription required - and worth it.)
Dr. Cole goes on to describe many of the failures (particularly the failure to protect the Pilgrims to holy places now that the Mahdi Army has been removed from that job by the Americans, and the increase in the number of helicopters being lost to insurgent fire with the adjustments and increased risks this causes.)
Dr. Cole describes the mechanism of failure in this paragraph:
The U.S. strategy assumes that if violence can be dramatically reduced in Baghdad and Anbar, that will give the al-Maliki government breathing room and allow it to assert itself more forcefully. But so far the government hasn't been afforded much relief from the horrific attacks that daily undermine its credibility with the public and provoke destabilizing tribal and religious feuds. That matters, because if Iraqis do not feel that their government can protect them from violence, they will turn again to guerrillas and militiamen. These paramilitary forces, based in the neighborhoods, in turn carry out ethnic cleansing and attacks on police, and further undermine the authority of the central government.
Elsewhere American commanders are already saying that the 21,500 additional troops will not be enough, that they need at least a further 4,000 to 6,000 and quickly.
Should I say "I told you so?" Yeah, and this is where I said it:
