The New York Review of Books offers "The Secret Way to War"By Mark Danner in its June 09, 2005 issue. As described by Danner, here is what Bush told the America public and the Congress:
- Iraq has weapons of Mass Destruction and ties to terrorists who will deliver them to American targets.
- If Iraq will destroy the WMD and permit comprehensive inspections, we will not attack Iraq. If Iraq will not comply, we will take military action.
- Congress needs to authorize the President to take military action - to be used only if Iraq does not comply.
- the President said emphatically, "I have not ordered the use of force. I hope the use of force will not become necessary."
- the Iraqis answered the President's demand by repeating their claim that in fact there were no weapons of mass destruction. As we now know, the Iraqis had in fact destroyed these weapons, probably years before George W. Bush's ultimatum: "the Iraqis"—in the words of chief US weapons inspector David Kay—"were telling the truth."
- Rather than let the UN weapons inspectors prove there were no WMDs, Bush invaded Iraq almost immediately after Congress voted to give him the option.
As we now know for a fact from the Downing Street Memo, Bush had already intended to invade Iraq months before he told everyone that it was dependent on Iraq action and got conditional Congressional approval for the invasion.
From the Danners' article:
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
Seen from today's perspective this short paragraph is a strikingly clear template for the future, establishing these points:
1. By mid-July 2002, eight months before the war began, President Bush had decided to invade and occupy Iraq.
2. Bush had decided to "justify" the war "by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD."
3. Already "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."
4. Many at the top of the administration did not want to seek approval from the United Nations (going "the UN route").
5. Few in Washington seemed much interested in the aftermath of the war.
We have long known, thanks to Bob Woodward and others, that military planning for the Iraq war began as early as November 21, 2001, after the President ordered Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to look at "what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to," and that Secretary Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, who headed Central Command, were briefing American senior officials on the progress of military planning during the late spring and summer of 2002; indeed, a few days after the meeting in London leaks about specific plans for a possible Iraq war appeared on the front pages of The New York Times and The Washington Post.
What the Downing Street memo confirms for the first time is that President Bush had decided, no later than July 2002, to "remove Saddam, through military action," that war with Iraq was "inevitable" and that what remained was simply to establish and develop the modalities of justification; that is, to come up with a means of "justifying" the war and "fixing" the "intelligence and facts...around the policy."
Danners' article in the New York Review of Books entitled "The Secret Way to War" describes how we got into this mess. Postwar Fiasco by Philips, David L. explains what happened after our troops reached Iraq.
The Bush administration has not credibly denied the Downing Street Memo. The Postwar Fiasco is similarly mostly public knowlege. It is not a pretty picture.
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