An excellent analysis of the Iraq insurgency

Pat Lang has posted an excellent analysis of the Iraq Insurgency. The groups making up the insurgency are:

The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major guerilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. Terrorist groups are Iraqi insurgents who actively target civilian populations, in an attempt to communicate their political messages through violent means. These groups, both insurgents and terrorists, are subdivided into countless smaller cells. Due to its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine. It is often divided by analysts into several main ideological strands, some of which are believed to overlap:

· Ba'athists, the armed supporters of Saddam Hussein;

· Nationalists, mostly Sunni Muslims (but also likely includes secular Shi’a members), who fight for Iraqi independence;

· Sunni Muslims who fight to regain the power they held under previous regimes;

· Sunni Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement;

· Foreign Islamist fighters, largely driven by the similar Sunni Wahabi doctrine, as well as the remnants of Ansar al-Islam;

· Criminal insurgents who are fighting simply for money; and

· Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties.

The Militant followers of Shi'a Islamist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, once active members in the insurgency, are supposedly not taking part in the overall violence at this time (September 2005).

Within the Sunni Triangle the motivations are considered to be:

A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerrillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning hearts and minds. It appears as though the Iraqi insurgency retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition counter-insurgency operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation.

Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is for a number of reasons; many residents received employment and opportunities from the former regime, the area has a history of strong tribalism and suspicion of outsiders, it is religiously conservative, and it has seen civilian casualties from coalition counter-insurgency operations.

Some observers, such as political scientist Wamidh Nadhmi, believe that the major division in Iraq is not between religious/ethnic groups nor between the general population and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those who resist it.

The Scope and Size of the Insurgency is estimated as follows:

The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerilla activity also takes place around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The insurgency is believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. A second "ratline" (the U.S. term) runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.

Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest U.S. assessments put the present number at between 12,000 and 20,000 hardcore fighters, along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S. forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):

· Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000-5,000 (since a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah insurgency has since been destroyed or dispersed)

· Samarra (December 2003): 2,000

· Baquba (June 2004): 1,000.

· Baghdad (December 2003): 1,000 (this number may have increased by a significant amount)

However, there is little agreement on the numbers involved. Estimates vary from 30,000 to some 200,000 fighters - a figure cited by Iraqi intelligence in 2005 – with foreign “jihadi” forces estimated at no more than 3,000 – 5,000 – but their profile is high. Based on the frequency and dispersion of daily insurgent attacks against multinational forces and Iraqis, the insurgency seems to be closer to the Iraqi intelligence estimate of 200,000 of hardcore fighters, rather than the U.S. estimate of 20,000. An analysis of the makeup of the overall Sunni Arab population in Iraq also bears this out. For example, the Sunni Arab population in Iraq is estimated to be 20% of the overall population of approximately 26 million which is 5.2 million Iraqis. Within that population there are a number of core organizations that likely supply most hardcore insurgents – as well as the structure. These are the Ba’ath Party – 2,000,000 members, with 50,000 hardcore senior members, the Fedayeen Saddam – estimated at 50,000 – 100,000 core members, the disbanded intelligence and security services – 150,000 – 200,000 members, and the disbanded Iraq military – 350,000 members with an estimated 175,000 Sunni Arab mid- to senior- ranking officers and Republican Guard members. While the vast majority of the hardcore members of these organizations are Sunni Arab, there are certainly a sizeble minority of Shi’a Arab members, some of whom are part of the current insurgency.

Based on the known ideological commitment and alienation of core Ba’ath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, and Intelligence and Security Service members, it seems reasonable that 30% of the members of these organizations comprise hardcore insurgents:

50,000 Hardcore Ba’ath Members x .30 = 15,000

75,000 Fedayeen Saddam Members x .30 = 22,500

175,000 Intel & Security Service Members x .30 = 52,500

175,000 Mid- to Sr- Sunni Army & RG Members x .30 = 52,500

Sub-Total = 142,500

Add to this an estimated 4,000 foreign “jihadis” = 4,000

Sub-Total = 146,500

If you add to this sub-total a very conservative estimate that 3% of the remaining Sunni Arab population in Iraq have become hardcore members of the insurgency participating in insurgent attacks, you have:

5,000,000 Remaining Sunni Arabs in Iraq x .03 = 150,000

Total = 296,500

This represents a considerably larger hardcore insurgent membership than the U.S. is willing to admit – and is probably a major factor in its inability to defeat the insurgency. Based on historical precedent, you can then apply a factor of ten to roughly identify the size of active and passive supporters of the insurgency. In this case, the figure is approximately 2,965,000.

These numbers seem to make sense given the fact that guerilla forces control most of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, with U.S. troop numbers in the area (less than 20,000) too small to contest them and with negligible Iraqi security force presence. Ramadi, the capital of the province, is under guerilla control with the exception of about half a dozen small forts operated by U.S. Marines. Al-Qaim, the first stop on an insurgent infiltration route from Syria, also is under rebel control. Fallujah, once the heart of the insurgency and formerly under rebel control, has since been largely leveled and is under a permanent lockdown by U.S. forces.

Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, is still one of the most contested regions of the country. Insurgents maintain a campaign of terror over much of the city's population and many Sunni neighborhoods such as Adhamiya are largely under their control. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces have also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted, have enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street.

Insurgents are also vigorously contesting control of the ethnically diverse northern city of Mosul, with much of the city, especially the western Arab half, slipping in and out of their control.

In short, this analysis suggests that the size of the insurgency is larger than we are being officially told, and that the current failure to get it under control is a result of too few effective troops in Iraq to control them.

The recent reports of the reduction of fully effective Iraqi troops from three battalions (about 2100 men) to one batalion (about 700 troops) suggests that we are not in a position to get control in Iraq.