The systemic problem in using Blackwater in a combat zone

As described in my previous post the Blackwater mercenary bodyguards working for the Department of State were caught on tape killing at least eight Iraqis caught in Baghdad traffic. I described there how detrimental the killings were to any effective counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Here I want to explain why I think they did what they did. It was a natural and normal mistake which is seen in infantry training exercises regularly, and is corrected only by good leadership and a lot of unit-level training.

Operating in a combat zone is a scary situation. You don't have to be paranoid to think everyone you see is out to kill you, because a lot of them really are. You understand that every time a you hear a shot fired anywhere.

So any time a person hears the shooting start they immediately find targets. Frequently they consider any movement or unexpected sound to be a target. In Baghdad, where the major weapon of choice is a car bomb, and moving car is a target. If not restrained the soldier will fire on the selected targets.

This is the natural, normal reaction of any group of armed soldiers who think they have come under fire. But few individuals can tell the difference between those shots fired at them and those fired by their fellow soldiers. A well-trained unit will not return fire until directed and released to do so by a commander they know and trust.

That trust takes a lot of time, experience and training as a unit to develop. A unit cannot go out and hire an experienced individual and make him into a leader his subordinates trust simply by assigning the rank and position. The trust and respect come only from training and experience as a unit. But mercenary units - like Blackwater, USA - have strong incentives NOT to spend time conducting unit level-training.

A mercenary unit is not paid to train. They are paid to perform the final function they were hired for. Training beyond simple entry-level indoctrination is not a cost their masters will want to pay for, and someone will offer their services without those costs built in, so the contracting process guarantees minimally trained units will be hired. Besides, effective extensive training cuts very heavily into the bottom-line of the owner of the mercenary organization. The result is that experienced well-trained units of government troops will almost always perform better than mercenaries will.

Roman troops were highly trained using effective organizational tactics, so that unless they were ambushed or very much outnumbered, then usually defeated their opponents. During the Thirty years war, government troops usually defeated mercenaries. War, or a counterinsurgency like Malaya, Vietnam and Iraq, is not fought by individuals as much as by organizations.

It is my opinion that the Blackwater troops in Baghdad suffered from a failure of leadership. Even in a convoy of only four SUV's, someone should have been in charge. The troops should not have fired until released, and if they did start shooting on their one, the leaders should have stopped the shooting before eight civilians were killed. The very system of using overpaid private contractors instead of trained government troops means that such control will be unlikely.

Blackwater will rightfully be blamed, but this is also another cost of trying to deal with the counterinsurgency that resulted from the ill-advised occupation of Iraq with too few forces. That blame goes directly back through Rumsfeld and Cheney to George W. Bush.