Bush has known for a long time that Iran had no nuclear program

It's taking a while to assemble all the parts of what was known about Iran, and before the public knew what the NIE said, any conclusion from all those parts would only be another conspiracy theory. But it appears now that Washington insiders have known for months that the NIE was not going to be one Bush could use to support his desired war with Iran. Anyone who really thinks that George only just learned that the Iranians had shut down the nuclear weapons program is living in a fantasy world in which drug addicts and alcoholics promise to stop taking drugs or drinking and then really do it. When George said he had only just learned of what the report had to say, he was lying.

One more Lie. Just one more lie, then another and another. Fourteen months to the end of Bush's term, and it's a long time, but he'll get there one lie at a time, just as he has gotten this far.

Josh Marshall has some more information about prior knowledge by Washington insiders that the NIE could not support Bush's desire for active war with Iran.

Conservatives invariably overstate threats to America

Diby has an excellent post describing how the American Conservatives have a pattern of always overestimating the strength of America's enemies and underestimating America's ability to deal with those enemies. Here is her introduction:

I have been writing for years that the neocons are always wrong about everything and this new NIE basically stating that the Iran threat has been vastly overstated drives that home once more. It would be funny if it weren't so dangerous.

The crux of their argument, going all the way back to their membership in the Scoop Jackson cult is that a vastly weakened America is in grave danger of being taken over by a totalitarian tyrant and that the intelligence agencies are underestimating the threat.

The pattern they have followed with this new National Intelligence Estimate is just an example, as was estimate of the danger of the USSR when it was in fact on its last legs. Go read Digby's excellent post.

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Addendum December 05, 2007 9:15 AM CST
Why would conservatives invariably overstate threats to America? In my opinion there are probably two reasons. First, these are likely to be people with a tendency for paranoia in the first place. But second, and more important, these are conservatives who have little to sell to voters beyond fear. They sell a philosophy that claims government cannot do anything, yet they are political actors trying to be elected to powerful positions in that government that according to them doesn't work, and when elected they work hard to make that statement true. Why would voters elect such a politician (or accept such a person as a high government official appointed by like-minded politicians.)

So NeoCons and other conservatives sell a story of fear to the public, pass themselves off as the new reincarnation of Winston Churchill, and demand extraordinary actions of Americans to defend the nation, and when that message succeeds in getting them elected, they are rewarded for selling that message of fear. Their purpose is to get elected and gain power, not to defend America from a threat. In fact, more often than not the threat is primarily imaginary.

Lieberman criticizes Democrats for criticizing Maliki

Poor Joe. Apparently his Republican "friends" don't trust him enough to keep him informed of their next PR offensive. Within mere minutes of the time Joe Lieberman criticized Democrats for trashing Iraqi PM Maliki, the Republicans released "...excerpts of a new National Intelligence Estimate from our intelligence services that...criticized the performance of the Maliki government in terms that are awfully similar to the things Democrats have been saying."

I can understand why Joe has abandoned the Democrats and gotten cozy with the Republicans. Joe's sole purpose in life these days is to convince Americans to shed American blood fighting in the Middle East to defend the Israeli nation with it's right-wing Likud government and policies, and among Americans only the Republicans are willing to conduct such idiotic wars.

But you'd think that at least the Republicans would keep him in the loop regarding their intended propaganda operations, wouldn't you?

Unless they don't trust someone who has become a traitor to the Democratic Party like Joe has. If he'll stab his previous Democratic friends in the back, perhaps his new Republican friends feel they need to be cautious around him.

Bush to defeat Jihadists by making them stronger

As I listened to the Diane Rhem Show this morning Dr. Phebe Marr, author of "A Modern History of Iraq" and an expert contributor to the report of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group, James Kitfield, senior correspondent, "National Journal" magazine and Col. Gary Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps--Retired all strongly made the point about how difficult it will be to withdraw from Iraq. Col Anderson's point that as we withdraw we continually have fewer troops available in country with which to protect our troops. (Force Protection.)

Essentially, getting out will be a lot harder than getting our troops into Iraq was. But just because it will be very hard to get out does not itself justify staying there and fighting.

Every strategy for success in Iraq depends on the government of Iraq taking control of that country and making it work again at least as well as it did under Saddam before we invaded. All of the Washington-designed benchmarks that were not met involved the failure of the government to achieve any success at all, and there is no indication that they will suddenly turn that around. Instead they have decided to take the month of August off and not bother trying.

Add to that the fact that our military presence can do nothing to make their government effective.

Michael Abramowitz reports today on what the National Intelligence Estimate which was released yesterday tells us. It's not good.

The White House faced fresh political peril yesterday in the form of a new intelligence assessment that raised sharp questions about the success of its counterterrorism strategy and judgment in making Iraq the focus of that effort.

Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, President Bush has been able to deflect criticism of his counterterrorism policy by repeatedly noting the absence of any new domestic attacks and by citing the continuing threat that terrorists in Iraq pose to U.S. interests.

But this line of defense seemed to unravel a bit yesterday with the release of a new National Intelligence Estimate that concludes that al-Qaeda "has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability" by reestablishing a haven in Pakistan and reconstituting its top leadership. The report also notes that al-Qaeda has been able "to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks," by associating itself with an Iraqi subsidiary. [Snip]

Although only a portion of the instability in Iraq is attributed to al-Qaeda and the group had no substantial power base there before the U.S. invasion, Bush again cast the war as a battle against its members, whom his aides have described as key provocateurs there. [Snip]

But many Democrats questioned the administration's explanations, seizing on the key judgments of the new intelligence estimate as yet another reason to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq and changing the administration's mission of the past four years.

Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.) said the current situation in Iraq "has helped to energize" al-Qaeda. "Changing our strategy in Iraq and narrowing our military mission to countering al-Qaeda terrorism -- as a bipartisan majority in the Senate now favors -- would be the single greatest thing we could do to undermine al-Qaeda's ability to use Iraq as a recruiting and propaganda tool fueling the growth of regional terrorist groups," he said in a statement.

Al-Qaeda's participation in the Iraqi violence has figured particularly heavily in recent administration arguments for a continued U.S. troop presence there, because White House strategists regard it as a politically salable reason for staying and continuing to fight.

Some terrorism analysts say Bush has used inflated rhetoric to depict al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of the same group of extremists that attacked the United States on Sept. 11 -- noting that the group did not exist until after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. These analysts say Bush also has overlooked the contribution that U.S. actions have made to the growth of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has been described as kind of a franchise of the main al-Qaeda network headed by bin Laden.

Paul R. Pillar, a former CIA analyst who has been involved in previous intelligence estimates, said that the administration has correctly identified the danger posed by al-Qaeda in Iraq and that there are indeed links between the Iraq group and the larger international terrorist network. But he said the White House is drawing the wrong conclusion, and argued instead that it is the U.S. presence in Iraq that is fueling the terrorists' cause.

"Iraq matters because it has become a cause celebre and because groups like al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda central exploit the image of the United States being out to occupy Muslim lands," Pillar said.

Referring to al-Qaeda in Iraq, Clinton administration official Daniel S. Benjamin, who has written books and articles on international terrorism, said: "These are bad guys. These are jihadists." He added: "That doesn't mean we [should] stay in Iraq the way we have been, because we are not making the situation any better. We're creating terrorists in Iraq, we are creating terrorists outside of Iraq who are inspired by what's going on in Iraq. . . . The longer we stay, the more terrorists we create."

So what the Intelligence experts are pointing out is that we created the insurgency in Iraq which we are now fighting, and that our presence there, far from protecting us from Jihadists, is in fact increasing their power and number world wide.

To paraphrase Molly Ivins, we are deep inside a nasty hole in the ground from which we have to escape, yet we are trying to dig down to find a way out. That is what is known as a counter-productive strategy. You don't win a fight by making your enemy stronger. But that is exactly what we are doing.

As Diane Rhem's guests made so clear, getting out of Iraq will be very difficult. But as the new NIE points out, our presence in Iraq is contributing to our ultimate defeat there, while offering no possibility of actually winning.

We should be working to defeat the Jihadists, not to strengthen them. It really is time for us to go.

The US in Iraq is like a bull in a ring being bled by picadores

Along with the full National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (which is classified) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has issued nine Page declassified set of the conclusions.(.pdf file) I present the key part below:

Key Judgments

Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.

• Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.

The challenges confronting Iraqis are daunting, and multiple factors are driving the current trajectory of the country’s security and political evolution.

• Decades of subordination to Sunni political, social, and economic domination have made the Shia deeply insecure about their hold on power. This insecurity leads the Shia to mistrust US efforts to reconcile Iraqi sects and reinforces their unwillingness to engage with the Sunnis on a variety of issues, including adjusting the structure of Iraq’s federal system, reining in Shia militias, and easing de-Bathification.

• Many Sunni Arabs remain unwilling to accept their minority status, believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent, and are convinced that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in ways that erode the state’s Arab character and increase Sunni repression.

• The absence of unifying leaders among the Arab Sunni or Shia with the capacity to speak for or exert control over their confessional groups limits prospects for reconciliation. The Kurds remain willing to participate in Iraqi state building but reluctant to surrender any of the gains in autonomy they have achieved.

• The Kurds are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee annexation of all or most of the city and province into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 31 December 2007. Arab groups in Kirkuk continue to resist violently what they see as Kurdish encroachment.

• Despite real improvements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—particularly the Iraqi police—will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities, and particularly to operate independently against Shia militias with success. Sectarian divisions erode the dependability of many units, many are hampered by personnel and equipment shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside of the areas where they were recruited.

• Extremists—most notably the Sunni jihadist group al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and Shia oppositionist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)—continue to act as very effective accelerators for what has become a self-sustaining inter-sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis.

• Significant population displacement, both within Iraq and the movement of Iraqis into neighboring countries, indicates the hardening of ethno-sectarian divisions, diminishes Iraq’s professional and entrepreneurial classes, and strains the capacities of the countries to which they have relocated. The UN estimates over a million Iraqis are now in Syria and Jordan.

The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.

Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.

• If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.

A number of identifiable developments could help to reverse the negative trends driving Iraq’s current trajectory. They include:

• Broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism to begin to reduce one of the major sources of Iraq’s instability.

• Significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create space for Sunni acceptance of federalism.

• A bottom-up approach—deputizing, resourcing, and working more directly with neighborhood watch groups and establishing grievance committees—to help mend frayed relationships between tribal and religious groups, which have been mobilized into communal warfare over the past three years.

A key enabler for all of these steps would be stronger Iraqi leadership, which could enhance the positive impact of all the above developments.
Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safehaven for expatriate Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.

• For key Sunni regimes, intense communal warfare, Shia gains in Iraq, and Iran’s assertive role have heightened fears of regional instability and unrest and contributed to a growing polarization between Iran and Syria on the one hand and other Middle East governments on the other. But traditional regional rivalries, deepening ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq over the past year, persistent anti-Americanism in the region, anti-Shia prejudice among Arab states, and fears of being perceived by their publics as abandoning their Sunni co-religionists in Iraq have constrained Arab states’ willingness to engage politically and economically with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad and led them to consider unilateral support to Sunni groups.

• Turkey does not want Iraq to disintegrate and is determined to eliminate the safehaven in northern Iraq of the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK, formerly PKK)—a Turkish Kurdish terrorist group.

A number of identifiable internal security and political triggering events, including sustained mass sectarian killings, assassination of major religious and political leaders, and a complete Sunni defection from the government have the potential to convulse severely Iraq’s security environment. Should these events take place, they could spark an abrupt increase in communal and insurgent violence and shift Iraq’s trajectory from gradual decline to rapid deterioration with grave humanitarian, political, and security consequences. Three prospective security paths might then emerge:

• Chaos Leading to Partition. With a rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq’s central government to function, security services and other aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the time frame of this Estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.

• Emergence of a Shia Strongman. Instead of a disintegrating central government producing partition, a security implosion could lead Iraq’s potentially most powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent strength.

• Anarchic Fragmentation of Power. The emergence of a checkered pattern of local control would present the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group clashes.

This is a very pessimestic report. The so-called "Surge" in Baghdad and Anwar Province clearly amounts to little more than sending a fly to stop a rogue elephant. The report strongly suggests that the U.S. will not be able to get out of Iraq anytime soon without outside help.

Unfortunately, for the U.S. to get "outside help" implies that our government is going to have to give up the idea that America can do it all and accept that the solution will require massive diplomatic action. Nothing the Bush/Cheney administration has done in five years suggests even a minimal diplomatic competence.

An example of the unawareness of the Bush administration is the insistence that they will not "rewars" Iran and Syria by negotiating with them. This is a weak strategy to begin with, and is based on the assumption that America is so strong that it is a reward to Iran and Syria to allow them to negotiate with the U.S. This report clearly demonstrates the fiction involved in this.

The bull in a bull fight is the most powerful being in the ring. His strength is unassailable, and if he demonstrates great courage he is greatly respected. The bullfighter cannot face him directly and survive. So first the picadores ride in on padded horses to attract the bull to attack and to lance the bull in the muscle above the forelegs. This "bleeds" the bull and gives the hints to his weaknesses. Then the matadore, having watched the bull for the weaknesses, enters the ring, exhausts the bull with planned moves behind capes, and finally (in Spain) kills the bull with his sword. It is a clear example of intelligence and experience over strength and courage.

Today the ring is Iraq, America is the bull and it faces a team of bullfighters who are bleeding it, weakening it, and measuring its strengths and weaknesses. The doors out of the arena of Iraq are closed, and America's leaders have yet to realize that they have been outthought and lured into a killing ground.

The NIE conclusions shown above are a step towards realizing how bad the situation really is.